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The issue of Northern Ireland has been one of the most important issues of foreign 
policy for the Irish state since independence, and for many periods was the single most 
important area of foreign policy activity.  Yet there is a surprising absence of analysis of 
the conflict from this perspective.  There are many more texts exploring British 
government policy, than Irish Government policy (eg. Cunningham 1991). 
 
The importance of partition, British-Irish relations and questions of sovereignty for the 
Irish state since independence is evidenced historically now only by events but is shown 
institutionally in the existence of a specific division with the Department of Foreign 
Affairs devoted to 'Anglo-Irish' relations, in the role of the separate Northern Ireland 
unit within the Department of An Taoiseach and in the role played by cabinet sub-
committees on Northern Ireland over the years.  However above all else it has been the 
impact of the Northern Ireland conflict on Irish society, the human cost of the conflict, 
the repeated high-level efforts made by Irish governments to resolve the conflict  and the 
ultimate success of the peace process which has elevated this question to the degree of 
importance it has attained.  While political tensions, and occasional acts of violence 
continue, at an international level it is the comparative success of the 'Northern Ireland 
case' which attracts attention and those involved in the peace process and academics who 
specialise in its analysis, such as this author, have been invited to share their experiences 
in conflict zones such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir and Afghanistan, 
while Ireland also hosts regular delegations seeking to learn from the Irish case.  
 
The focus of this paper is Irish Government policy and action on the Northern Ireland 
conflict.  Inevitably this will involve some discussion of the wider issues but there is 
insufficient space to summarise the history of either the conflict or peace process here 
and it has been well done elsewhere (for example in O’Leary and McGarry, 1996; de 
Breadún, 2008).  There have however been few discussions which focus centrally on the 
role and policy of the Irish state.  In terms of time period this paper focuses primarily on 
the period of the peace process, after a brief context setting section highlighting some 
key themes.    However to set the scene for this paper a few elements of historical 




The Historic Context 
 
There was a very limited 'Northern Ireland' strategy by the Irish state, after 
independence. The focus in the immediate aftermath of the civil war was on internal 
stability and state-building.  While political elites clearly hoped that time might help 
resolve divisions, there was a prevailing sense of powerlessness on the issue and a sense 
that any attempt to pressurise Britain on the question would be fruitless and would lead 
to internal instability.  Even when Fianna Fáil came to power on a strongly nationalist 
platform, their focus was on those aspects of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which they 
perceived as being within their power to alter - the oath of allegiance to British 
monarchs, the role of the Governor General, the Treaty Ports and (less successfully) land 
annuities.  In international circles Irish diplomats constantly raised the issue in a vain 
hope of embarrassing Britain, but beyond that there was no coherent strategy either to 
achieve Irish unity or to attain a more sustainable situation short of unity.  There was 
clarity however on attitudes to the IRA - Irish Governments acted swiftly against the 
IRA, with proscription, internment without trial and emergency laws whenever the IRA 
sought to launch armed actions. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of world war two, there was a very naive attempt to use 
Ireland's possible membership of NATO as a bargaining chip with the USA, in the hope 
that the US Administration would be prepared to pressurise Britain on the Northern 
Ireland question.  Given the huge importance of the 'special relationship' between the 
USA and UK, it inevitably failed, only further weakening Ireland's diplomatic position on 
the issue.  After a period alternating between diplomatic anti-partition rhetoric at all sorts 
of international conferences, commonly known as the ‘sore thumb’ policy and quiet 
inactivity, the early 1960s saw a certain rapprochement between Dublin and Belfast, with 
the first formal meetings since independence.  While little of any substance was achieved, 
the contacts, for a brief moment before the conflict erupted, seemed to offer hope of 
better cross-border relations at least.  
 
The absence of a sense of purpose or power to achieve any progress, partly at least, 
explains the initial confusion around Irish government policy as the conflict erupted in 
the late 1960s and early 70s.  The dominant view was one of seeking to protect the 
stability of the state, but a minority within Government saw the civil rights movement 
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and the early conflict in more romantic terms - as a possible opportunity to complete the 
unfinished business of independence and secure a British withdrawal from Northern 
Ireland.  The conflict also energised a new attempt to engage Britain diplomatically, 
seeking to persuade the UK that the Irish state could play a constructive role, not least in 
informing the British Government of nationalist concerns and in providing some insight 
into their perspectives.   
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s however British Governments still retained the view 
that the Irish Government had no business ‘interfering’ in Northern Ireland. As street 
violence escalated in late 1969 the British Government refused to meet the Irish 
Government or even to discuss the crisis (Kennedy 2001, Dorr 2010). This view 
softened somewhat in the 1970s; however until at least the mid 1980s, there was little real 
acceptance on the British side that a good relationship required them to take Irish 
government concerns seriously and so, in general, unionist concerns were given priority 
over those of the Irish government, whenever the British government was calculating its 
own state interests.  Irish governments and diplomats therefore faced a challenging 
situation, not only with the emerging conflict itself but also in seeking to engage a British 
government, reluctant to listen to their view. 
 
 
The Sources of Influence on Irish Government Policy  
 
Irish Government policy on Northern Ireland does not of course emerge in a vacuum.  
There will rarely, even within government be a unanimous view on either long term 
strategy or the needs of any particular moment.  In addition, even if those sitting around 
a cabinet table, or in senior positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs are all in 
agreement about what ought to be done, there will be other factors to take into 
consideration, such as public opinion, pressure from opposition political parties, the 
likely reaction from the British Government and external international factors.  In 
analysing the factors which influence Irish Government policy on Northern Ireland over 
the years some key issues need to be explored.  To what extent was public opinion a 
factor in influencing government policy?  Did party political competition and changes of 
the party composition of government influence the policy followed?  Did the relative 
weakness of the Irish state, compared to Britain, impact on the strategic choices made 
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and finally to what extend was policy adopted influenced by external factors, from the 
European Union or more globally ?   
 
Public Opinion   
Irish public opinion on Northern Ireland and relations with Britain has been difficult to 
judge and analyse.  On the one hand, there seemed at times to be considerable 
indifference to the conflict, reinforced by limited real understanding of the nuances of 
the local situation.  At other times, in particular after some highly emotive events such as 
the killing of unarmed protestors by the British Army on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in 1972, public 
opinion was highly mobilised, reflecting a nationalist intensity that is usually only seen 
when Ireland plays England in a sporting competition.  Fear of the lingering impact of 
populist nationalism, led the Irish government to introduce censorship of all Irish radio 
and television, banning not only the IRA, but all members of Sinn Féin from radio and 
television on any topic, even when they were not appearing as spokespersons, or even 
identified as a member (Seanad Éireann, 1975).  This provision which lasted until 1994 
made it impossible for journalists to adequately cover the conflict, added to a sense of 
distance from the situation and increased levels of ignorance among the public.   
 
Irish government ministers, of all political parties, often expressed a fear of public 
opinion and assumed that they would pay a high price in terms of popular support if they 
were perceived to compromise too much with Britain or to fail to pursue the interests of 
northern nationalists.  Those negotiating what became the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement, 
decided not to aim for an amendment to Articles 2 and 3, the provisions of the Irish 
constitution which then described the national territory as being the whole island of 
Ireland, because they formed the judgement that the necessary referendum to pass the 
amendment would not pass without a more comprehensive peace agreement and such a 
deal was not on offer from the British government.    
 
Yet, despite consistent evidence from those involved in Irish government that they 
believed support for Irish unity and a nationalist analysis of the conflict was relatively 
strong among the public, political scientists have largely dismissed Northern Ireland as an 
important issue for Irish voters.  This apparent puzzle is worth examining.  Northern 
Ireland rarely features in a list of the top ten issues which voters say are decisive in any 
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given election, but the conflict and peace process have been important in other ways, all 
of which then have an influence on government policy-making.   
 
Firstly, both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael often used the issue to mobilise their most 
committed voters and activists, to distinguish themselves from the ‘other’ party.  Party 
activists, in all countries are more committed on core policy issues than the wider public 
and if party leaders use an issue such as Northern Ireland to motivate activists they are 
obliged when in government to give some weight to their views, even if it is not the most 
important influence.  Secondly, and more significantly, there have been occasions when a 
number of swing voters, motivated by this question, have decided closely fought 
elections and through that competition for their votes have influenced party and later 
government policy to some degree at least.  The 1981 election was held during a very 
tense period, when republican prisoners were on IRA hunger strike in prison in 
Northern Ireland, in a protest over prison conditions, which was in effect a demand to 
be recognised ‘political prisoners’.  The protests had led to the death of four prisoners 
before polling day, including the IRA leader in the prisons Bobby Sands.  IRA prisoners 
stood in eight constituencies, with some supporters standing in others. While securing a 
relatively small national percentage, the election of two IRA prisoners denied Fianna Fáil 
an overall majority.  The election also led to a decision by Sinn Féin to contest elections 
for the first time since the beginning of the conflict  All governments which followed 
sought to engage the British government in a process of reform, partly to reduce the 
electoral appeal of Sinn Féin and to bolster moderate nationalists in the SDLP.   
 
On other occasions the impact on party policy and later government policy was more 
direct.  For example, in the aftermath of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, most voters 
viewed the development positively and Fianna Fáil's opposition to it, voiced very vocally 
by party leader Charles Haughey, left that party open to challenge.  An MRBI poll 
conducted for The Irish Times in the week after the Agreement was signed saw 59% 
approval for the Agreement but perhaps more importantly 43% of Fianna Fáil voters 
approved while only 52% supported the Haughey position (MRBI, 1987).  As the 
campaign developed and Fine Gael were losing ground in the polls, Fine Gael, the 
Labour Party and the Progressive Democrats simultaneously made an issue both of 
Fianna Fáil’s alleged ambiguity in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and of potential 
problems for Anglo-Irish relations that could be created if Haughey was elected 
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Taoiseach.  15% of the voters in a close run election saw policy on the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement as ‘very important’ to them according to an MRBI/Irish Times poll and the 
failure of Fianna Fáil to secure an overall  majority may well have rested on their position 
on the Agreement.  In the aftermath of the election Fianna Fáil abandoned its previous 
policy and supported the Agreement in government (Doyle and Connolly, 2002).  
 
In an MRBI poll taken just after Albert Reynolds became Taoiseach in 1992, when the 
peace process did not have the public profile it would later receive, 80% of respondents 
identified Northern Ireland as a priority for his Government, compared, for example to 
99% for unemployment and 70% for the EU (Marsh and Sinnott, 1993: 99).  In the 
following 1997 election, held during the breakdown in the IRA ceasefire, between 10% 
and 11% of all voters thought Northern Ireland would be the main issue in the election 
and there were considerable differences between the parties on their proposed approach 
to the peace process - in particular on the issue of Sinn Féin’s inclusion in talks and also 
on whether the government’s role was to advocate on behalf of northern nationalists or 
pursue their own interests regardless of northern nationalist opinion. (MRBI, 1997).  The 
outgoing Taoiseach John Bruton, had as Fine Gael leader consistently argued that the 
role of the Irish Government was to be equidistant between northern nationalists and 
unionists rather than part of the nationalist consensus at the heart of the peace process 
and he declared that a vote for Sinn Féin in advance of an IRA cease-fire would be a vote 
for violence.  However, his government colleague, Labour leader and Tánaiste Dick 
Spring, was reported as saying that a Sinn Féin vote in the election was a vote for peace.  
Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern attacked Bruton for his failure to give leadership to 
nationalist Ireland, while Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin accused the Taoiseach of 
mismanaging the peace process (Murphy 1998: 130).  In an analysis of opinion polls, 
Marsh and Sinnott (1999: 174) found that ‘if a voter spontaneously mentioned Northern 
Ireland as a factor influencing his or her vote, he or she was substantially more likely to 
vote for Fianna Fáil in preference to any other party save Sinn Féin’.  The negative 
impact on the government parties (Fine Gael, Labour Democratic Left) was, they say, 
‘quite substantial’.  Just as Fine Gael benefited from focusing on the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement in 1987, it seems that Fianna Fáil had successfully convinced the electorate 
that they rather than Fine Gael could best manage the peace process in 1997 and in both 




In the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement Fianna Fáil clearly sought to promote 
their involvement in the peace process to maximum effect with their pre-election 
billboard advertising focused on the economy and the Good Friday Agreement in 
roughly equal proportions.  In addition to competing with Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil now 
saw Sinn Féin as a much more significant electoral threat than they had been previously.  
A high profile on Northern Ireland and a strong commitment to North-South links was 
designed to hold (and attract) more nationalist minded voters.  However in this election, 
unlike 1997, Fine Gael managed to prevent Northern Ireland becoming a topic of debate 
in the campaign.  Michael Noonan in his campaign for the Fine Gael leadership had 
promised to bring Fine Gael back to the nationalist centre and move away from what 
many within Fine Gael perceived to be the unpopular stance taken by John Bruton.  
Michael Noonan saw that a debate on Northern Ireland would serve to benefit Fianna 
Fáil and sought to prevent Fianna Fáil making it a point of policy difference between the 
parties.   In that election’s party leader's debate, the mere four minutes out of seventy 
which were dedicated to Northern Ireland were remarkable for their consensual tone 
(RTE, 14 May 2002).  It was the one exchange of the evening where Noonan made no 
attempt to counter Ahern or to critique Fianna Fáil policy (Doyle and Connolly, 2002).  
The key point of this analysis is that the election competition between the parties and the 
balance of public opinion, not only made the difference between winning and losing 
elections, it also led in 1987 and in 1997 to policy shifts and in 2002 saw Fine Gael 
shifting their position to close off this issue as a factor in the election. 
 
International Influences  
 
Apart from public opinion and the private considered views of the politicians and senior 
diplomats other factors which need to be considered in analysing Irish foreign policy in 
this area are the relative strength of the Irish and British states and the role (or in most 
cases absence of interest) of the wider international system.  Ireland’s small size and 
relative poverty meant that any attempt to try and force a change of policy from the 
British government was unlikely to succeed.  The original Treaty had reflected this power 
imbalance and the attempt to force British concessions on land annuities in the 1930s led 
to retaliatory sanctions from Britain, which caused huge economic costs on Ireland and 
forced the de Valera-led government to reverse policy.  It also highlighted for all future 
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governments the potential costs of a combative approach to Britain.  As the conflict 
erupted and escalated a small minority briefly considered using the emerging IRA as 
leverage against Britain, but ultimately a fear that the conflict might spread South and 
that Sinn Féin would seek to challenge them politically meant that even those willing to 
overlook the moral issues involved never pursued this possibility after 1970.  This not 
only altered the tactics utilised by Ireland it also fed into the state’s understanding of the 
substantive question.   If there was little possibility of either pressurising or persuading 
any British government to pursue a policy of supporting a united Ireland against their 
own wishes and unionist objections, then pursuing such a policy was at best a waste of 
energy, but was in fact likely to be more negative and to prevent Ireland making progress 
on other diplomatic issues where a good relationship with Britain would be important. 
 
If challenging Britain directly was not a real foreign policy option, another possibility was 
to seek to mobilise international opinion or international organisations to pursue 
diplomatic objectives as non-state Irish-American organisations had attempted over the 
years or as others such as the South African anti-apartheid movement had successfully 
done.  This policy was attempted at various times, but repeated attempts to embarrass 
Britain at diplomatic events failed to have any impact.  The attempt to use potential 
NATO membership as leverage with the USA in the late 1940s simply ignored the 
realities of post war politics. Britain’s permanent seat and veto at the UN security council 
ensured that body would never intervene, even if other powers wished to (which they 
did not).  Even during the Cold War there was no serious attempt to utilise the Northern 
Ireland question for strategic purposes.  Guelke (1989) refers to a general mood in the 
international system which favoured the Irish Government over the UK, but this rarely 
led to any concrete action, not least because there was little which most states could do.  
The only states seeking to utilise the conflict to attack British interests were states which 
were already marginalised such as post-Revolution Iran or Libya.  No Irish government 
welcomed their interest and even guerrilla movements, who had sympathy for Sinn Féin 
such as the PLO or ANC kept the contacts at a low and discreet level as their own cause 
would have been damaged by any serious public links with the IRA.   
 
Irish governments did however make significant efforts, from the mid 1970s onwards to 
mobilise members of the US Congress who had Irish roots or were sympathetic to the 
Irish government’s position.  During the Cold war it was difficult to make progress, as 
 9 
the importance of the US-UK special relationship in international affairs placed 
significant limits on what was possible.  There were occasional signs of progress, such as 
with US President Jimmy Carter’s St Patrick’s Day statement in 1978, the first such 
statement by an American President, and his ban on arms sales to the RUC.  President 
Reagan also raised Northern Ireland directly and in private with British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher, expressing a hope that talks then beginning with the Irish 
Government would be successful.   There were also constant non-governmental 
organization (NGO) criticisms of British policy in Northern Ireland, but the level of 
international pressure was never enough to have a significant impact (Guelke, 1989).  As 
outlined in more detail in the discussion on the Good Friday Agreement, the greater 
flexibility in the US position in the 1990s, created an opportunity whereby the hard work 
in the 1980s saw greater results, with the very high profile intervention of US President 
Bill Clinton.         
 
The European Union also refrained from any involvement in the conflict (Ruane and 
Todd, 1996: 280).  There was and remains a limited legal basis in the Treaties for direct 
intervention and Britain was very hostile to any involvement whatsoever until the late 
1980s at least.  After the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, there 
were more consistent interventions as Britain could not prevent discussion of the issue, 
given the more open procedures of the Parliament.  In 1980 the strongly nationalist 
independent MEP Neil Blaney unsuccessfully called for an investigation by the Legal 
Affairs Committee of the parliament into human rights issues in Northern Ireland.  
Some Irish MEPs from the government parties supported another attempt in 1981 to 
raise the hunger strikes, but it is not clear if the Irish government exerted any diplomatic 
effort on the issue.  The amended resolution reinforced the limited powers of the then 
EC with the phrase ′recognizing that the European Community has no competence to 
make proposals for changes in the Constitution of NI’ (Ruane and Todd, 1996; Guelke, 
1989).  There were individual motions on human rights issues over the following years, 
passed with Irish government support and in the face of British government opposition, 
though often supported by individual left wing British MEPs.  The most significant 
diplomatic initiative was in February 1983 when the parliament decided that its political 
affairs committee should conduct an investigation into the political and economic affairs 
of Northern Ireland (Guelke 1989; Ruane and Todd, 1996).  The British Government 
made what even they in hindsight recognised as a diplomatic blunder by condemning the 
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move, calling it interference in their internal affairs and refusing to cooperate.  The 
ultimate report, with Niels Haagerup MEP as rapporteur, was rather bland and simply 
called for the establishment of joint British-Irish responsibilities in a number of specified 
fields, ‘politically, legally and otherwise’. However it established a precedent of 
involvement and created some international pressure on the British Government to 
cooperate more fully with the Irish government.  It is this informal pressure which was 
the EU’s main contribution rather than any formal role.  It was the first international 
institution where the UK was required to engage with Ireland on a fully equal basis and 
where they often needed an Irish vote on the Council of Ministers and it also created 
opportunities for quiet side-meetings away from the glare of publicity.  The limited role 
of the EU however meant that Irish diplomacy primarily looked to the USA for 
international support and that was also reflected in the peace process and the Good 
Friday Agreement.  While the EU had a very limited role in the politics and diplomacy of 
the peace process they did provide substantial financial resources in the aftermath of the 
1998 agreement, aimed at building support for the process by showing an immediate 
socio-economic dividend.    
 
  
The Content of Irish Government Policy   
 
The above discussion on the key influences on Irish Government policy highlights how 
difficult it was to develop a Northern Ireland policy which recognised the international 
environment, satisfied competing interests and which made some progress.  The result 
was often that the state was conflicted in its strategic goals.  From 1923 onwards all 
governments, naturally prioritised the stability of the state and opposition to the IRA 
when that organisation was active.  There was no obvious policy, which offered a 
strategy to achieve Irish unity.  Until the 1990s an improved relationship with unionists 
might well have been seen as postponing the possibility of Irish unity and not as a 
strategy to achieve it.  Yet governments faced a public with a nationalist political culture, 
which if relatively subdued for most of the time, could in response to events in Northern 
Ireland come to the surface and pressurise governments to act and even influence 
election outcomes.  In the absence of an obvious strategy, doing nothing apart from 
expressing a dutiful wish for Irish unity was often the response.  One impact of this 
inactivity was that even very moderate northern nationalists felt they had in effect been 
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abandoned by successive Irish governments and this meant that Irish government 
influence within the nationalist community was much weakened by the late 1960s when 
the civil rights protests and ultimately a new IRA campaign emerged. 
 
The period of the initial hesitancy in 1968-70 was reflected most strongly in what is 
known as the Arms Crisis.  Two government ministers, Neil Blaney and Charles 
Haughey, were dismissed by the Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, who accused them of 
involvement in a botched arms deal with the IRA.  The charges against Blaney were 
dropped and Haughey was acquitted, and the question of whether the Taoiseach and 
other senior members of the cabinet had known or approved what was being done 
remains contested to this day.  As the conflict escalated within Northern Ireland a 
relatively consistent Irish Government policy emerged, which was pursued regardless of 
which party was in power over the following 15 to 20 years.  This was clearly articulated 
for the first time in the 1973 ‘Sunningdale Agreement’, but it survived the collapse of that 
effort.   
 
The Irish Government’s Northern Ireland Policy from 1972 to 1992 was based on the 
following key elements: 
• Full and public opposition to the IRA campaign.  
• Asserting a role for the Irish Government in seeking a solution to the conflict  
• Support for a power-sharing system of government within Northern Ireland 
between moderate nationalists and moderate unionists, which would be linked in 
a loose and consensual way with the Irish state.   
• An acceptance that constitutional change would only occur with the consent of a 
majority within Northern Ireland.   
• A belief that a power-sharing government would erode support for the IRA 
among the nationalist community – as potential IRA supporters would see 
another way to make progress and a belief that such a broad-based government 
would have a much greater legitimacy to take hard-line security measures against 
any remaining IRA campaign.   
• A strategic view that such an outcome could only be achieved by working with 
the British Government and not by attacking it internationally, though efforts 
were always made to engage US policy-makers to act as persuaders with the 
British government. 
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• (Particularly in the negotiation of the 1985 Agreement) seeking to persuade the 
British Government, that in the absence of power-sharing within Northern 
Ireland, the Irish Government should have a formal role in representing the 
interests of northern nationalists. 
 
The details of how this policy was pursued of course varied at the level of detail and 
different possible arrangements were discussed and attempted over the years.  However 
none of those attempts managed to restore or replace the power-sharing ‘Sunningdale 
agreement’ government which collapsed in 1974.   The lead up to the Good Friday 
Agreement saw some continuity with this period, but also a significant change of 
strategic direction and a more detailed examination of that period shows the importance 




Strategic Change - the Road to the Good Friday Agreement 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a narrative of the peace process, but talks 
between Hume and Adams, and various contacts, including contacts involving the Irish 
Government, behind the scenes, ultimately bore fruit when the IRA announced a cease-
fire in August 1994. There is no evidence of a secret deal with the British to produce the 
cease-fire, rather it reflected a strategic move by the IRA to get itself out of a position of 
military stalemate and create a new nationalist momentum, combined with a shift in Irish 
Government policy to encourage and strengthen this change within the IRA.  Sinn Féin 
knew it could not on its own pressurise the United Kingdom to withdraw; it needed a 
broader political base and this is confirmed from a leaked document in 1994 (Cox et al., 
2006: appendices).  
 
There had been talks between Sinn Féin and the SDLP in 1988, which failed to make any 
progress towards an agreed position or an IRA ceasefire.  These were followed by a set 
of talks chaired by the British Government and involving Irish Ministers, the SDLP and 
the unionist parties, (but, because of the continuing violence, not including Sinn Féin or 
Loyalist representatives). , The aim was to explore the options for a new agreement but 
the absence of any progress over more than a year of talks with unionists and the 
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continuing development of strategic thinking in Sinn Féin, which he was following, 
convinced John Hume, the undisputed leader of moderate nationalism, that an 
opportunity was opening for a dramatic change of strategy.  This coincided with a 
leadership change in Fianna Fáil and a new Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, who had no 
prior public profile on Northern Ireland.  Reynolds was briefed on exploratory secret 
contacts between representatives of the Irish Government and Sinn Féin, which had 
been authorised by his predecessor Charles Haughey who had taken some risk in doing 
so.  Reynolds, unlike his predecessor, had no residual ‘baggage’ deriving from the ‘arms 
crisis’ of 1970 discussed above and, with a leadership style focused on finding solutions, 
he effectively reversed key elements of previous Irish government policy (Coogan, 1995: 
352).  Previous policy as outlined above had been based on trying to isolate Sinn Féin 
and build a centrist agreement between the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party, with the 
hope that this would erode support for the IRA and eventually bring peace.  Reynolds 
opened a more intensive dialogue with Sinn Féin with the aim of getting a cease-fire first 
- before political negotiations - and based on including Sinn Féin in government and not 
excluding them, on condition that the IRA agreed to end their armed campaign.  He also 
encouraged John Hume in his dialogue with Sinn Féin, despite unprecedented attacks on 
Hume in the media when the existence of those talks leaked.   The opposition parties 
were initially very hesitant about this new approach, but opinion polls suggested a high 
level of support for the Hume-Adams dialogue as it was called (because the Irish 
Government involvement was still secret).  This new approach, though initially 
associated with Reynolds personally, survived an unrelated  change of government in 
early 1995, as a senior advisor in the new Irish Government argued that any agreement 
that excluded Sinn Féin was ‘not worth a penny candle’ (The Irish Times, 26 April 1996). 
 
The British government was very wary of this change of approach by the Irish 
government, and dubious about the dialogue between the Irish Government and Sinn 
Féin, before ultimately being persuaded that this was a process that they should support.  
While the IRA was relatively contained, incidents in the early 1990s such as the bombing 
of London’s financial district and of Downing Street itself imposed significant financial 
and political costs and made a more permanent solution than containment attractive.   It 
was clear that the British Government did not believe that it could militarily defeat the 
IRA and it was extremely worried that a prolonged public engagement with Sinn Féin, if 
it was followed by the collapse of the IRA ceasefire, would actually lead to a newly 
 14 
energised and stronger IRA campaign.  Irish Government diplomacy needed to persuade 
the British Government that this initiative could meet their number one objective, which 
was an enduring IRA ceasefire, at a political cost which they were willing to pay in terms 
of the content of a political agreement.  There was extensive dialogue between Irish and 
British officials from 1992 onwards, and work on drafting of texts continued to be 
informed by exploratory contacts through intermediaries with the aim of securing a 
commitment from both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries to cease their armed 
campaigns as a condition for the eventual involvement of their respective political 
affiliates in possible future comprehensive negotiations. This work ultimately lead to an 
important joint statement by the two Prime Ministers – the Downing Street Declaration 
– in December 1993.  The language was considerably softened over the course of 
negotiations.  In early drafts the Irish Government had unsuccessfully sought to get the 
British government to commit to becoming a ′persuader’ for Irish unity.  However, after 
a few delays, the process was sufficient to set up an IRA ceasefire.  The British 
Government remained a somewhat reluctant partner and their position in the House of 
Commons where they relied on unionist support on key parliamentary votes made their 
position difficult.  Ultimately the election of a new and highly energetic Labour 
Government led by Tony Blair in 1997 saw a much more committed British engagement 
and a better relationship with the Irish Government in the run up to the 1998 agreement.    
 
The Irish Government also played a large role in drawing US President Bill Clinton into 
active and supportive involvement in the process. US visas for Sinn Féin leader Gerry 
Adams and IRA leader Joe Cahill were crucial confidence-building measures in the run-
up to the IRA cease-fire.  Partly this was the outcome of a long process of engagement, 
by Irish Governments, in particular with Irish Americans in the US Congress, seeking to 
build support for a more active US involvement on the issue.  The ending of the Cold 
War opened up greater possibilities for international involvement in the conflict. It 
weakened the importance of the US relationship with the United Kingdom—a crucial 
factor, as the USA was the only international actor likely to be able to exert influence on 
the United Kingdom (Cox, 1998).  Northern Ireland was a low-risk intervention for the 
USA, but it did involve President Clinton in serious tension with an ally—to the extent 
that British Prime Minister John Major refused to take his phone calls—and the visa 
decision was taken against the advice of almost the entire foreign policy, defence and 
intelligence establishment (Coogan, 1995: 373).  While the new world order permitted 
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President Clinton’s intervention, it did not prompt it. For motivations, it is necessary to 
look at the domestic pressure on Clinton (O’Cleary, 1996).  The fact that the President of 
the US had chosen to become personally involved in the later talks, at a level beyond 
anything required by his electoral needs, increased the pressure on political actors to 
reach agreement and, as nationalists had least interest in accepting the status quo, this 
intervention favoured nationalists (as they wanted change), even if the process of 
intervention was even-handed, which it was.  This quiet pressure on Britain to make 
greater efforts to come to a joint approach with the Irish Government was crucial in 
strengthening Irish diplomacy and in building a dynamic towards agreement.    
 
If the Reynolds government led a major change in strategy, the actual content of the 
agreement sought by the Irish government drew heavily on the long-term policy of 
previous governments, but with some key changes, without which the agreement would 
not have been reached.  These changes to the solution sought most obviously involved 
the inclusion of Sinn Féin and release of IRA prisoners but also a more formalised 
institutionalisation of North South links with a relatively open-ended agenda and far 
reaching transformation of policing (Doyle 2010).   
 
The Agreement reached by the two Governments and the main Northern Ireland parties 
(excluding the DUP) in April 1998 included a power-sharing consociational-style 
government (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004), a new Northern Ireland regional assembly 
and a structured set of cross-border institutions. Sinn Féin was to be included in the 
power-sharing government, the cease-fire was to be reinforced, prisoner releases were 
provided for and a programme of reform for police, criminal justice, cultural rights and 
economic equality was set in place.  The Agreement provided for a new Assembly elected 
by proportional representation, to have ‘full legislative and executive authority’ in respect 
of matters devolved from London.  Elected members, on taking their seats, have to 
designate themselves as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’. Key decisions are made with 
either 50% support from each community or a 60% overall majority, including at least 
40% support from each bloc. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are elected by 
the process of parallel consent, designed to ensure that one will be a unionist and one a 
nationalist. They effectively operate as a single institution. Other ministerial posts are 
allocated to parties on the basis of the number of Assembly seats held (Doyle 1998; 
DFA, 1998).  
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To ensure that the North-South Council actually operated and was not frustrated by 
unionist opposition to such cross-border institutions, the Assembly and the North-South 
Council are declared to be ‘mutually interdependent ... one cannot successfully function 
without the other’. Participation in the Council is declared to be ‘one of the essential 
responsibilities’ attaching to a ministerial post.   This was a key demand of nationalists.  
The SDLP believed that the British government might have been more willing to defend 
the 1974 power sharing experiment if there had been a formal institutionalised 
international dimension with another state, rather than the looser Council of Ireland 
envisaged in 1974.  Whether that analysis is accurate or not, it created a political reality 
that neither of the two parties representing northern nationalists would support a deal 
without strongly institutionalised North-South cooperation.  This was also crucial to Sinn 
Féin in persuading their support base that they had another strategy to replace reliance 
on the IRA campaign to deliver change.   
 
The British and Irish Governments agreed to redraw their constitutional expressions of 
sovereignty on Northern Ireland, stating: 
 
it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively 
and without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of 
consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that 
is their wish, accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and subject to the 
agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland (DFA, 1998). 
 
In Ireland’s case this led to an amendment to articles 2 and 3 on the constitution through 
a referendum, removing the description of the nation in territorial terms (as the entire 
island and its seas) and replacing it with a definition of the nation defined in terms of 
people and asserting the ‘firm will’ of the Irish nation for unity.  The key elements of the 
new articles 2 and 3 then read as follows  
 
‘It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes 
its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish nation…’ (Art. 2,) 
 
It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who 
share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, 
recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent 
of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island… (Art. 
3) 
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The ceasefire and the constitutional changes were key elements for the British 
government, persuading them to move further than they ever had before on 
institutionalising North-South cooperation and on internal reform within Northern 
Ireland in areas such as policing and equality laws.  It also created a new relationship 
between the two governments.  Differences of opinion of course remained, but there 
was now a much greater commitment from the British side to try and present a joint 
approach with the Irish government on all key issues.   
 
Signing an agreement is of course only a beginning, not a ‘settlement’.  The agreement 
encountered many difficulties in its implementation and it was a decade later before the 
power-sharing executive was operating in a consistent manner.  High levels of inter-
governmental negotiations and all-party talks and repeated US interventions by President 
Clinton and his envoy US Senator George Mitchell were required on many occasions to 
secure the ongoing implementation.  On one occasion the Irish and British governments 
only reached agreement on how to proceed at a late night Downing Street summit, held 





The case of the Good Friday Agreement is an interesting one, not just because of the 
outcome but because it is an example of high level diplomacy and an internationally 
significant successful peace process.  It includes some important elements which are 
relevant for the analysis of Irish foreign policy more generally.  It involved a fundamental 
change of strategy in response to changed circumstances.  While in hindsight this can be 
seen to have worked, at the time it was seen as high risk and controversial, with no 
guarantee of success.  The factors which lead a government to undertake such major 
changes in direction are very important in the study of foreign policy in general.  In this 
example there was a long period of failure to make progress, but unfortunately 
international examples suggest that on its own that is not enough to produce change.  
However the concept of ripeness in conflict resolution theory suggests that a stalemate 
such as existed, where neither side believes a military solution is possible, can often be an 
opportune time for successful mediation (Zartman, 1997).  There was also a change of 
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leadership in the Irish Government in 1992 at the start of the process and in both 
governments in 1997, before the actual formal negotiations, which in this case at least 
assisted in the creation of a dynamic for change.   
 
Public opinion was also important.  This was not simply an agreement by elites.  If the 
agreement was to involve changes to Articles 2 and 3of the Irish constitution relating to 
the definition of the national territory, then a referendum had to be passed.  Irish 
Government negotiators needed to be confident that the agreement was sufficiently far 
reaching to secure support for such an important change.  In practice they wanted a 
result which was overwhelmingly in favour, so they could use that support to deny 
legitimacy to any break-away groups from the IRA who sought to oppose the agreement.  
The British government could have constitutionally delivered on the agreement by 
normal legislation at Westminster but it supported the holding of simultaneous referenda 
North and South, not only to challenge IRA dissidents, but also to firm up support in the 
unionist community and to defend its own position against conservative critics in 
London.  Public opinion therefore played two roles.  It acted as a constraint on what elite 
negotiators could agree as they needed to be able to sell it.  Afterwards, public opinion 
also played a legitimising role for the Good Friday Agreement and allowed its supporters 
to deny such legitimacy to opponents of the deal.       
 
The success of Irish strategy also rested on external events.  Some of these, such as the 
end of the Cold War were totally beyond the control of Irish foreign policymakers but 
they certainly left open many different choices in how to respond.  The ability, for the 
first time to persuade a US president to become personally involved to a significant 
degree was a significant success for Irish diplomacy.  Given Britain’s powerful position in 
international affairs, there was no other country in the world which could have exerted 
such quiet diplomacy over a British Government.  A more ‘neutral’ mediator, such as a 
retired Scandinavian diplomat for example, would have been easier to exclude entirely if 
Britain wished to and, even if allowed to play a role, would have been easier to ignore.  
The US never sought to blame the British government publicly.  That was not their role 
and even a US President might have been rebuked by Britain, if they had tried.  However 
there is little doubt that they played a major role in persuading Britain to move their 
position the little bit extra that was required to reach agreement, first of all with the Irish 
government and then with the political parties in Northern Ireland.             
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The Good Friday Agreement and the question of Northern Ireland policy show that 
foreign policy making is complex.  It involves a multi-layered approach, balancing the 
views of government ministers and opposition politicians, the strength of public opinion, 
which can be difficult to gauge and a changing international environment.  Successful 
diplomacy needs to both deal with the demands of stakeholders and chart a strategy 
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